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ABSTRACT 
Now days, every company is facing data leakage. That is very 
serious problem faced by company. An owner of enterprise 
has given confidential data to its employee but most of the 
time employee leaks the data. That leak data found in illegal 
place such as on the web of comparator enterprise or on 
laptop of employee of comparator enterprise or the owner of 
Comparators Company’s laptop. It May or may not be 
observed by owner. Leak data may be basic code or design 
provision, cost lists, rational property and copy rights data, 
trade secrets, forecasts and budgets. In this case the data 
leaked out it leaves the company goes in undefended the 
authority of the corporation. This uninhibited data leakage 
puts business in a back in position. To find the solution on this 
problem we develop two models. First, when any employee of 
enterprise access confidential data without the consent of 
owner in that case ,we developed data watcher model to 
identifying data leaker and suppose employee given data 
outside the enterprise for that we devolved second model for 
assessing the “guilt” of agents. Guilt model are used to 
improve the probability of identifying guilty third parties.  
For implementing this system, we used educational institute 
database. In this system we consider, data owner is college 
chairman called as distributor and other employee is called as 
agents. For that we considered two condition sample or 
explicit condition because agents want data in sample or 
condition.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In company or small fire or educational institute, owner must 
hand over sensitive data to supposedly trusted agents For 
example; financial data give to the financial employee for 
making balance sheet or for making financial transaction but 
that data was leaked out. Similarly, a company may have 
partnerships with other companies that require sharing 
customer data. We consider applications where the original 
sensitive data cannot be perturbed. Perturbation is a very 
useful technique where the data are modified and made “less 
confidential” before being handed to agents. For example, one 
can add random noise to certain attributes, or one can replace 
exact values by ranges [1]. However, in some cases, it is 
important not to alter the original distributor’s data. For 
example, if financial data cannot be perturbation. If medical 
researchers will wants exact data of patients. They may need 
accurate data for the patients. Traditionally, leak-age detection 
is handled by watermarking, e.g., a unique code is embedded 
in each distributed copy. If that copy is later discovered in the 
hands of an illegal party, the leaker can be identified. 
Watermarks can be very useful in some cases, but again, 
involve some modification of the original data. In addition, 
watermarks can sometimes be fractured if the data recipient is 
malicious. In this paper, we study unobtrusive techniques for 
detecting leakage of a set of objects or records [7][8].  
Specifically we study the following scenario: In every 
enterprise, data leakage is very serious problem faced by it. 
An owner of enterprise has given sensitive data to its 
employee but in most of the situation employee leak the data. 
That leak data found in un-authorized place such as on the 
web of comparator enterprise or on laptop of employee of 
comparator enterprise or the owner of comparators laptop. It 
is either observed or sometimes not observed by owner. Leak 
data may be basic code or design provision, cost lists, 
relational property and copy rights data, trade secrets, 
forecasts and budgets. At this point, the distributor can assess 
the likelihood that the leaked data came from one or more 
agents, as opposed to having been independently gathered by 
other means. If the distributor sees “sufficient proof” that an 
agent leaked data, he may stop doing business with him, or 
may initiate legal proceedings. In this paper, we develop a 
model for assessing the “guilt” of agents. Such objects do not 
correspond to real entities but appear practical to the agents. 
In a sense, the fake objects act as a type of watermark for the 
entire set, without modifying any individual members. If it 
turns out that an agent was given one or more fake objects that 
were leaked, then the distributor can be surer that agent was 
guilty [1].  
2. OBJECTIVE 
A data violate is the unintentional release of secure 
information to an untrusted environment. The goal is to 
estimate the likelihood that the leaked data came from the 
agents as opposed to other sources. Not only to we want to 
estimate the likelihood the agents leaked data, but we would 
also like to find out if one of them in particular was more 
likely to be the leaker with large number of overlapping. The 
data allocation strategies help the distributor “cleverly” give 
data to agents. Fake objects are added to identify the guilty 
part, to address this problem four instances are specified. 
Depending on which the data request is provided. Depending 
upon the type of data request, the fake objects are allowed.  
A distributor owns a set T = {t1, t2, t3…tm} of valuable data 
objects. The distributor wants to share some of the objects 
with a set of agents U1, U2….Un, but does not wish the objects 
be leaked to other third parties. The objects in T could be of 
any type and size, e.g., they could be tuples in a relation, or 
relations in a database. An agent Ui receives a subset of 
objects Ri є T, determined either by a sample request or an 
explicit request:  
Sample request Ri = SAMPLE (T, mi): Any subset of mi 
records from T can be given to Ui.  
Council for Innovative Research                                                                       International Journal of Computer & Technology 
www.ijctonline.com  ISSN: 2277-3061                                                                                                Volume  3. No. 1, AUG, 2012 
 
45 | P a g e                                                       w w w . c i r w o r l d . c o m  
Explicit request Ri = EXPLICIT (T, Condi): Agent Ui receives 
all the T objects that satisfy Condi [1].  
Background and Motivation  
3. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
Data Leakage Worldwide Common Risks and Mistakes 
Employees Make examined the relationships between 
employee behavior and data loss, as well as IT perceptions of 
those factors. The survey found that employees around the 
world are engaging in behaviors that put corporate and 
personal data at risk that IT professionals are often unaware of 
those behaviors, and that preventing data leakage is a 
business-wide challenge [2].  
The helpfulness of Security Policies, offered insight into how 
security policy creation, communication, and compliance 
affect data leakage. The analysis showed that a lack of 
security policies and a lack of employee compliance with 
security policies were significant factors in data loss. And as 
in the first set of findings, the survey showed that IT 
professionals lacked important awareness-in this case about 
how many employees actually understand and ob-serve with 
security policies. Thus it is concluded that companies must 
address the dual challenge of creating security policies and 
enforcing employee compliance [2].  
The guilt detection approach is related to the data provenance 
problem [9] tracing the lineage of S objects implies essentially 
the detection of the guilty agents. Tutorial [3] provides a good 
over-view on the research conducted in this field. Suggested 
solutions are domain specific, such as lineage tracing for data 
warehouses [4], and assume some prior knowledge on the way 
a data view is created out of data sources. Our problem 
formulation with objects and sets is more general and 
simplifies lineage tracing. As far as the data allocation 
strategies are concerned, our work is mostly relevant to 
watermarking that is used as a means of establishing original 
ownership of distributed objects. Watermarks were initially 
used in images [5], video [6]. Watermark cannot be inserted. 
In such cases, methods that attach watermarks to the 
distributed data are not applicable. Finally, there are also lots 
of other works on mechanisms that allow only authorized 
users to access sensitive data through access control policies. 
Such approaches pre-vent in some sense data leakage by 
sharing information only with trusted parties [5].  
An employee who is disgruntled or seeks to gain profit 
through illegal actions that involve corporate resources can 
become an insider threat that adds a dangerous new dimension 
to the data loss prevention challenge. The disgruntled insider 
threat defines a common awareness that the most significant 
security threats originate outside the company. Employees 
with a spiteful agenda and a profit motive can use their insider 
status to engage in activities that cause even greater financial 
loss than external threats. Rightful network access and 
stewardship of devices such as laptops and PDAs makes it 
simple for disloyal employees to leak corporate data [2].  
Some employees simply fail to return company devices when 
they leave a job. This is an expensive and dangerous activity 
for businesses because it adds yet another avenue for data 
loss. Even if only 5 percent of exiting employees take a 
device, that adds up to 50 employees in a company of 1000, or 
500 in an enterprise of 10,000 employees. For larger 
organizations, the financial and data loss risks are far more 
significant.  
A shocking 11 % of employees reported that they or fellow 
employees accessed unauthorized information and sold it for 
profit, or stole computers. Employee reasons for keeping their 
corporate devices when leaving a job included needing the 
device for personal use (60 %), getting back at their 
companies, and a belief that their previous employers would 
not find out. 20 % of IT professionals said disgruntled 
employees were their biggest concern in the insider threat 
arena [2].  
4. EXISTING SYSTEM 
In many cases distributor must indeed work with agents that 
may not be trusted, and distributor may not be sure that a 
leaked object came from an agent or from some other source, 
since sure data cannot admit watermarks. In existing system 
there is few problem like fixed agents and existing system 
work comparable with agents whose request known in 
advance. Also with adding fake object original sensitive data 
cannot be alter and absences of agent guilt models that capture 
leakage scenarios and appropriate model for cases where 
agents can collude and identify fake tuples. Lastly system is 
not online capture of leak scenario also in existing system 
more focus on data allocation problem.  
5. PROPOSED SYSTEM 
To find the solution on this problem we develop two models. 
First, when any employee of enterprise access sensitive data 
without the consent of owner in that case, we developed data 
watcher model to identifying data leaker in this point suppose 
data leaker will identify then no need to calculating the 
probability of agents that method gives near about 90 % of 
result. But suppose employee given data outside the enterprise 
for that we devolved second model for assessing the “guilt” of 
agents. Guilt model are used to improve the probability of 
identifying guilty third parties.  
For implementing this system we used educational institute 
database. In this system we consider data owner is college 
management called distributor and other employee is called 
agents. For that we take two condition sample or explicit 
condition because agents want data in sample or condition. In 
this approach, the model for assessing the “guilt” of agents is 
developed. The option of adding “fake” objects to the 
distributed set is considered. Such objects do not correspond 
to real entities but appear practical to the agents. In a sense, 
the fake objects acts as a type of watermark for the entire set, 
without modifying any individual members. If it turns out an 
agent was given one or more fake objects that were leaked, 
then the distributor can be more confident that agent was 
guilty.  
Proposed System worked on two processes  
5.1 Data Distribution Method 
In that considered two exiting techniques for data allocating to 
the agents. There are four instances of this problem they 
address, depending on the type of data requests made by 
agents (E for Explicit and S for Sample requests) and whether 
“fake data” are allowed (F for the use of fake data, and F for 
the case where fake data are not allowed). Fake data are data 
generated by the distributor that are not in set T. The data are 
designed to look like real data, and are distributed to agents 
together with the T data, in order to increase the chances of 
detecting agents that leak data [1].  
5.2 Probability Finding Process 
While distributing the data to any agents some kind of 
receiver’s information can be added to find out the guilty 
agent it is more concentrated on finding the probability of an 
agent to be found as guilty. Data object is to be important 
aspect of our work; it is consider agents parameter and 
overlapping between pair of agents of this data object which 
we are forwarding to other agent. The parameter would then 
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be checked once a data object is received from a malicious 
target for that used a special process for data object is 
received from any target the probability is calculated the data 
object came from which source or we can guess that which 
agent has leaked the data. Guilty Agent Model would be used 
to find the agent to be guilty with numerous conditions. Also 
we have considered if the object cannot be guessed or if its 
probability can’t be find out then the agent can’t be 
considered to be guilty  
5.3 Steps for Finding Guilt Agent  
Distributor select agent to send data. Distributor selects the 
agents to send the data according to agent request.  
 Distributor creates fake data and allocates it to the agent. The 
distributor can create fake data and distribute with agent data 
or without fake data. Distributor is able to create more fake 
data; he could further improve the chance of finding guilt 
agent.  
Check number of agents, who have already received data. 
Distributor checks the number of agents, who have already 
received data.  
Check for remaining agents. Distributor chooses the 
remaining agents to send the data. Distributor can increase the 
number of possible allocations by adding fake data.  
Estimate the probability value for guilt agent. To compute this 
probability, we need an estimate for the probability that values 
can be “guessed” by the target.  
6. IMPLEMENTATION 
In company or small fire or educational institute, owner must 
hand over sensitive data to supposedly trusted agents For 
example; financial data give to the financial employee for 
making balance sheet or for making financial transaction but 
that data was leaked out. Similarly, a company may have 
partnerships with other companies that require sharing 
customer data. We consider applications where the original 
sensitive data cannot be perturbed. Perturbation is a very 
useful technique where the data are modified and made “less 
confidential” before being handed to agents. For example, one 
can add random noise to certain attributes, or one can replace 
exact values by ranges [1]. However, in some cases, it is 
important not to alter the original distributor’s data. For 
example, if financial data cannot be perturbation. If medical 
researchers will wants exact data of patients. They may need 
accurate data for the patients. Traditionally, leak-age detection 
is handled by watermarking, e.g., a unique code is embedded 
in each distributed copy. If that copy is later discovered in the 
hands of an illegal party, the leaker can be identified. 
Watermarks can be very useful in some cases, but again, 
involve some modification of the original data. In addition, 
watermarks can sometimes be fractured if the data recipient is 
malicious. In this paper, we study unobtrusive techniques for 
detecting leakage of a set of objects or records [7][8].  
At this point the distributor can assess the likelihood that the 
leaked data came from one or more agents, as opposed to 
having been independently gathered by other means [1][7].  
In the figure Fig. (1) Distributor has been given the data to 
agents according to the request by agents. In this system 
database maintained by Distributor according to the request 
by agents data passing to agents with fake or without fake 
object. When agent doing the business with target without the 
consent of distributor and leak data. Distributor discovers 
some of those same objects in an unauthorized place. (For 
example, the data may be found on a web site, or may be 
obtained through a legal discovery process or someone’s 
laptop). Then distributor match leak data with his data.  
Distributor also check overlapping of data among agents and 
then he calculating probability of agents varies for {0, 1}  
 
 
 
 
Fig 1: Architecture of data leakage detection 
7. RESULTS AND DISSCUSION 
The effectiveness of a system is most commonly described 
with its "Record wise leak report" and “Probability of agent 
guilty”.  
Record wise leak report=  
This formula calculates records wise leak data without 
considering agents overlapping. According to that the 
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distributor knows which agents consider for calculating guilt 
probability. 
Probability of agent guilty=  
This formula calculates records wise leak data with 
considering agents overlapping mean that particular record 
share by how many agents. According to that the distributor 
knows which agents consider for calculating guilt probability. 
 
Fig 2: Agent guilt probability distribution 
As shown In Fig.(2) given guilt probability of agents like 
agent1 having 0.9 probability means he having more probable 
to leak the owner data then agent3 having 0.7 then agent 5 
having 0,5 likewise owner can find out leak scenario.  
Table 1. Comparative analysis between existing system 
and proposed system 
 Algorithm 
Parameter 
Existing Data 
guilt model 
Data guilt model 
with data watcher 
Techniques used 
Checking 
overlapping 
between 
agents 
Checking 
overlapping between 
agents 
Creation of fake 
data 
In every 
iteration 
Depend upon the 
data 
Condition used 
for allocating 
object to agent 
Sample and 
explicit 
Sample and explicit 
Number of 
agents 
2 or 3 More than 5 agents 
Agent request 
Known in 
advance 
Not need due to data 
share watcher 
8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In the company owner hand over its sensitive data to 
employee but before that owner of data must be add water 
mark to each and every sensitive data. Also check the record 
of employee means that particular employee is legally 
responsible or not to handle that data or not. Then hand over 
data to employee. Suppose that employee leak data accidently 
for this case owner considering that things. But employee will 
do this data leakage deliberately then owner think about that 
employee and owner boycott that particular employee form 
shared data or confidential work or talk. 
In spite of these difficulties, we have shown it is possible to 
assess the probability that an agent is responsible for a leak, 
based on the overlie of his data with the leaked data and the 
data of other agents, and based on the probability that objects 
can be “guessed” by other means. The data distribution 
strategies improve the distributor’s chances of identifying a 
leaker. It has been shown that distributing objects judiciously 
can make a significant difference in identifying guilty agents, 
especially in cases where there is large overlap in the data that 
agents must receive. In some cases “practical but fake” data 
records are injected to improve the chances of detecting 
leakage and identifying the guilty party. Our future work 
includes extension of this work considering allocation 
strategies so that they can handle agent requests uniquely in 
an online fashion. 
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